M 7.4 earthquake disaster, followed by tsunami and liquefaction, that hit Central Sulawesi on September 28, 2018, had resulted in thousands of fatalities and various physical and infrastructural damage in Palu City, Sigi District, Donggala District, and part of Parigi Mautong District. The Provincial Government of Central Sulawesi has noted that 4,042 people died, more than 100 thousand houses were damaged, and more than 172 thousand people had to evacuate.
Responding to the disasters, the Indonesian Government had asked the World Bank to activate the Contingency Emergency Response Component (CERC), that was attached to National Slum Upgrading Project (NSUP), a project funded by the World Bank and had been underway in Central Sulawesi long before the September 28, 2018 disasters. This was meant to call for immediate actions to rehabilitate and reconstruct damages caused by the disasters.
The budget allocated for NSUP-CERC was US$100 million. Aside from restoring public facilities, NSUP-CERC would build more than 1,600 units of permanent housing for disaster-affected communities. In the implementation, NSUP-CERC would comply with the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) NSUP, approved by the World Bank in 2016.
To support the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Central Sulawesi, the Indonesian Government applied for a loan to the World Bank for Central Sulawesi Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CSRRP). The US$150 million loans were then approved by the Executive Board of Directors of the World Bank on June 19, 2019. The CSRRP loan was schemed for five years and would be used for reconstructing, rehabilitating, and strengthening public facilities, also to build more than 7,000 units of permanent housing for disaster-affected communities. Besides, to fulfill the public needs, CSRRP was also designed to increase the capacity of government partners and the executors to ensure the quality and the standard of practice in construction were met.
In the Project Appraisal Document, the World Bank classified CSRRP as high risk. However, since the project was prepared in the context of disasters emergency, environmental and social assessments and plans—referring to Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) and following Environmental and Social Standards (ESS)—would be developed during the project implementation phase.
NSUP-CERC would carry out the preliminary work for CSRRP to ensure, when the CSRRP loan became effective, the transition from NSUP-CERC to CSRRP could run effortlessly. NSUP-CERC facilitators were activated to initiate the activities in the field. NSUP-CERC provided bridging assistance to support the project management (through National Management Consultant, NMC), the overall designs and construction supervision for housing-settlement infrastructures (Technical Management Consultant, TMC), and public facilitation. The preliminary work conducted by NSUP-CERC was also preparing the completeness of CSRRP documents—Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) documents were among them—as required by the World Bank.
At the early phase, CSRRP was equipped practically with only two documents that were previously drafted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. These two documents were the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP) and Stakeholder Engagement Plan (SEP). In these two documents, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing explained the plans, strategies, steps, and actions that would be taken to align CSRRP with ESF and ESS.
SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi, with the support from Bank Information Center (BIC), was monitoring the implementation of NSUP-CERC/CSSRP funded by the World Bank. The monitoring process was conducted from January 2020 to September 2020. We considered this monitoring is necessary as part of our efforts to participate in the process of implementing the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction of Central Sulawesi.
Based on the result of the monitoring, in general, we saw that there was a wide gap between the concept, planning, and implementation in the field. This project also has its problems and challenges. Some of the problems and challenges that we noted are (1) the lands intended for permanent housing were not clean and clear, (2) the data of prospective permanent housing’ beneficiaries was still unfinished, and (3) there were still a lot of people who refused to be relocated to permanent housing areas that had been designated by the government.
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing was not completely and seriously implementing the commitment and plans to provide housing as stated in the ESCP, SEP, and ESMF documents. This was quite worrying.
Based on the plan to build around 1,600 units of permanent housing in the first phase by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, only 630 units were constructed. The construction was rather slow. They missed the deadlines, far from the original plan. Permanent housing in Pombewe and Duyu site, initially scheduled to finish in April 2020, is still ongoing. From 230 permanent housing planned to be built in Duyu, only 11 units are ready to be inhabited.
Until this report is written, two years after the disasters, overall, only 2,882 units permanent housing for relocation scheme are available, for habitation or still in construction, from the requirement of 11,788 units as planned. More than 8,900 units are needed to be constructed. In fact, if we refer to Central Sulawesi Governor Regulation number 10 the Year 2019 about Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, permanent housing for beneficiary communities were supposed to be available in less than 2.5 years.
Related to this matter, there are five issues that we consider crucial and need to be addressed seriously. These five issues are (1) As a policy, World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) is only normatively bound the borrowing country; (2) Unfinished documents needed for project implementation; (3) Weak coordination and involvement of local government; (4) Lack of public role and participation; and (5) Lack of attention towards gender, children, and people with disabilities issues.
These five issues eventually will trigger further impacts and implications. Combined with the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, the construction process of permanent housing will be increasingly hampered.
We will thoroughly explain those five issues in the Key Findings section of this report.
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This report was written based on the result of monitoring conducted by the Solidarity of Human Rights Violation Victims (SKP-HAM) Central Sulawesi on the implementation process of provision of permanent housing for the disaster victims in Central Sulawesi, funded by the World Bank through NSUP-CERC/CSRRP. The monitoring process was conducted from January to September 2020.
The monitoring Team periodically conducted field visits, especially to Duyu, Pombewe, and Tondo-Talise, the locations of large-scale resettlement, to directly monitor the construction project of permanent housing in those locations. On the initial monitoring process, we distributed questionnaires to 40 respondents. The selected group of respondents were the Disaster-Affected People (DAPs) which would be the permanent shelter beneficiaries, the communities around the project, Project-Affected People (PAPs), and the construction workers of permanent housing.
The monitoring Team conducted informal and in-depth interviews with more than 20 people from the group of respondents. The questions in the questionnaire and interviews with the group of respondents were more focused on gaining information about the following topics: (1) Their involvement and participation as a part of a community in the planning and provision process of permanent housing, (2) Problems that they were facing related to provision and construction process of permanent housing, (3) Complaint mechanism that they were using when there were issues or cases that they wanted to report, including—not explicitly—issues or cases concerning gender-based violence, sexual exploitation, and violence against children.
We also conducted interviews and discussions in small groups with local government officials (especially with government officials of Palu City), the team from Ministry of Public Works & Housing as the project implementer, and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), especially those working on women, children, and vulnerable groups issues.
In the discussion with the local government and the team from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, we tried to gain information about the effort to provide permanent housing, coordination, and division of roles between agencies, problems, and challenges faced in the field, and their understandings about the NSUP-CERC/CSRRP scheme for the permanent housing project funded by the World Bank, including discussions about documents completeness that was needed to conduct the project.
With CSOs, the discussion was focused on remapping various issues concerning women, children, and vulnerable groups post-disaster in Central Sulawesi. In the discussion, we also examined whether the principles of public participation, inclusiveness, and mainstreaming as mandated by the various policies related to post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction in Central Sulawesi, especially regarding NSUP-CERC/CSRRP, had been implemented or not.
During the monitoring process, Monitoring Team also conducted desk research to review and study various documents, both NSUP-CERC/ CSRRP documents about the provision of permanent housing funded by the World Bank and policy documents, local and national, especially those related to post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Central Sulawesi.
To complete and support the desk research, we monitored and acquired the news from mass media (especially online media, both local and national) that published the implementation process of the provision of permanent housing in Central Sulawesi. We monitored and acquired the news that was published starting from September 2019. Other than to gain additional data and information, this news helped us to trace the dynamics that had occurred in the implementation and construction process of permanent housing.
In the middle of the monitoring process, we published a report that included some initial findings. We then used this report as materials to conduct a focus group discussion (FGD) with several stakeholders related to the implementation of the permanent housing project. Other than to gain and deepen information, the FGD was also intended as a space to confirm, clarify, and validate various information and findings that had been written in the report from interested parties.
We conducted three FGDs with participants that were divided into three large groups. First FGD was held with participants from the DAPs group which would be the permanent housing beneficiaries, PAPs, and communities around the permanent housing project. The second FGD was conducted with the participants from CSOs and journalists. The third FGD was conducted with the participants from local government official group and project implementation team from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing (the Ministry of Public Works & Housing Task Force, the Settlement and Regional Infrastructure Agency (BP2W) Central Sulawesi, Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP) Team, NMC Team, NSUP-CERC/CSRRP Bridging Team), and Special Committee on Disaster Recovery from Regional Representative Council (DPRD) of Central Sulawesi.
The Monitoring Team has set up a website, https://monitoring.skp-ham.org, as a part of the monitoring process. In this website, we store all documents that had been reviewed and studied, news that had been acquired, and reports that had been written.
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Environmental and Social Framework (ESF): Normative World Bank Policy
On October 1, 2018, the World Bank has effectively implemented the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) to replace Safeguard Policies. The World Bank later obliges every borrowing country to comply with ESF in every project funded by them.
The World Bank has been campaigning the ESF as its vision for sustainable development. The objective of ESF is to ensure that the public and environment will be protected from the potential adverse impacts caused by their funded projects. By implementing this policy, the World Bank and borrowing countries will be able to improve environmental and social risk management. The World Bank believes that the implementation of ESF will also strengthen, among other things, the principles of transparency, non-discrimination, public participation, accountability, and expanding the role of complaint mechanism.
In the agreement between the World Bank and borrowing country, ESF is listed as one of the things needed to be complied and implemented. The borrowing country then will place ESF provisions in the ESCP document. Drafting the ESCP document must be consistent with the provisions stated in the Environmental and Social Standard (ESS).
The World Bank does apply so many rules and provisions. From the human rights perspective, the rules and provisions stated in the EFS and ESS can be seen as sufficient to meet the elements of respect, protection, and fulfillment of basic rights, especially citizens’ rights. With the spirit of strengthening the principles of non-discrimination, participation, inclusion, as well as transparency, accountability, and accessibility which are the basic principles of good governance.
With a positive mindset, the policies, rules, and provisions for World Bank’s funded projects, if implemented consequently, (it may be) possible to give a glimmer of hope for a change into the development model and process that have been done so far. Perhaps with this new framework, the World Bank wants to respond to global demands as well as answering the challenges addressed to them by the critics.
However, as we read available documents, compliance and implementation of the World Bank’s ESF (which later be placed in the ESCP document by the borrowing country) seem only at the normative level. In the context of the CSRRP loan agreement between the World Bank and the Indonesian Government, for example, there is no clause related to sanction or penalty if the Indonesian Government, as a borrowing country, does not comply nor implement the provisions stated in the ESF.
This, of course, is very unfortunate. No matter how ideal the borrowing country has drafted the ESCP document that is consistent with ESF, eventually, this commitment plan has a possibility to not (fully) implemented. Therefore, ESF might lose the spirit and objectives as it cannot guarantee and ensure that the project will evade any irregularities, adverse impacts, and human rights violations.
Land clearing by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing at the location of permanent housing in Talise Valangguni, Mantikulore Sub-District, Palu City, which had been conducted by force and tend to be repressive, could give a strong indication that ESF and ESCP drafted by the Indonesian Government, as a borrowing country, were only applied normatively. If we refer to various guiding documents (ESF, ESCP, ESS, ESMF NSUP, ESMF CSRRP), the land clearing process conducted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing could be seen as a violation of the rules. They did not take an approach that relied on mechanisms, guidelines, and guidance that should be complied to, either the ones stipulated by the Acts of the Republic of Indonesia and its rules of implementation of the policies and rules issued by the World Bank.
ESF, which is based on the spirit to improve the environmental and social risks management of a project, is sinking in this case instead. While in fact, the World Bank pays special attention to the public consultation and involvement process, especially PAPs, and it becomes one of the mandatory rules that must be complied with. In general, it is stated in ESS 10, and specifically for land acquisition, the involvement of PAPs is stated in ESS 5. The consultation and involvement of PAPs are also clearly stated in the ESCP document (point 5.3).
Conducting land clearing by force and tend to be repressive, which has been done by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, only triggered further social conflicts and problems. PAPs in Talise Valangguni staged a demonstration because they felt wronged and treated unfairly. They had to stand face-to-face with the security officers (police and military). One of the public figures in Talise Valangguni, in an FGD session conducted by Monitoring Team, even gave a statement, “If they insist to build permanent housing in this location, do not blame us if this area becomes the next Nunu—Tavanjuka.”
To date, the land clearing process in Talise Valangguni is still ongoing. Unfortunately, during our monitoring process, the World Bank had not taken any actions, either to solve the problems or, at least, to alleviate social conflicts and upheavals that had arisen in the public. The potential of adverse impacts caused by the project has overshadowed the future.
Referring to the Talise Valangguni case, we view that the Indonesian Government (c.q. Ministry of Public Works & Housing), as a borrowing country, had violated the rules, provisions, and commitments that had been made. With the absence of immediate actions from the World Bank, the World Bank is also considered waiving this condition and does not implement its own policies and rules.
Unfinished Project Documents
As a consequence of the obligation to fulfill and comply with the ESF, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing had to prepare some needed (and required) documents by the World Bank to support NSUP-CERC/CSRRP. These documents were important because it would be the guidance, guidelines, and reference to execute the project and to handle various problems and challenges that would arise in the field. At the beginning of project implementation, documents that had been drafted were ESCP and SEP.
In the ESCP document, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing promised to draft other needed documents. Some of these documents were very important, such as Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), Land Acquisition and Resettlement Policy Framework (LARPF), Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan (LARAP), Feedback and Grievance Redress Mechanism (FGRM), and Environmental Impact Analysis (AMDAL) document or Environment Management Efforts (UKL)—Environment Monitoring Efforts (UPL) documents.
Drafting these promised documents, from our point of view, was delayed. ESMF CSRRP document was released to the public (at least as we received) in August 2020, more than a year from when the project loan was approved. As an important project document, we are not sure why, until this report is written, the ESMF CSRRP document is not available on the
CSRRP-World Bank website, the storage for all CSRRP documents that are open to the public. ESMF document in Bahasa Indonesia is written with elusive language structures. There are inconsistencies in writing (for example, in one section they use ‘perempuan’ for women, but in another section, they use the word ‘wanita’).
Other unfinished documents are LARAP and LARPF. We receive the latest information that these documents are being finalized. However, we can say that the completion of the LARAP document is delayed. If we refer to the ESMF implementation schedule, it is already more than a year since the drafting process of these LARAP documents has started.
The absence of project implementation guidance and guidelines documents resulted in some consequences. The permanent housing construction process was delayed. In the context of land acquisition for the permanent housing’ locations, for example, from the information we acquired from the field, the consequences were quite serious.
Again, we want to use the land dispute case in Talise Valangguni as an example. The absence of LARPF had caused the Government of Palu City, the Regional Office of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) Central Sulawesi, and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing respectively referred to different policies regarding land acquisition and its mechanism. Whereas, land acquisition mechanism and policy had been clearly regulated in Acts of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2 the Year 2012 about Land Acquisition for Development in the Public Interest and Presidential Regulation of Republic Indonesia Number 71 the Year 2012 with all its changes as implementation rules.
Unfortunately, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing itself did not fully refer to Acts Number 12/2012. To justify the land clearing process in Talise Valangguni’s location, for example, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing only referred to Article 49 Paragraph (1) of the acts. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing responded to PAPs’ objections to the land clearing as an attempt to block the access and could be threatened with fines and criminal penalties as mentioned in Article 50 and Article 77 of Acts of Republic Indonesia Number 24 the Year 2007 about Disaster Management. As a matter of fact, if referring to ESMF (both ESMF NSUP and ESMF CSRRP), the land acquisition mechanism should fully refer to Article 14 to Article 39 of the Acts Number 12/2012.
This land acquisition is only one thing. The resettlement mechanism, especially for vulnerable groups with special needs, livelihood recoveries for communities who will be relocated, and education for their children in the new location, for example, will need a policy framework to be the foundation for steps and actions to be taken. Other than the policy framework, a separated database for vulnerable groups, up to now, is not even fully available.
To date, the whereabouts of AMDAL or UKP-UPL documents are still unknown. We cannot find UKL-UPL documents for permanent housing construction in Duyu and Pombewe which has been conducted since early 2020, as well as other planning documents for both locations.
Due to the absence (or nonexistence) of these documents, there were practically no socialization, information, and evaluations related to environmental matters. Various issues related to the plan and mitigation of disasters in the permanent housing’ locations remained unpublished. For example, from the beginning, some parties had expressed their concerns about permanent housing in the Duyu site because the location was vulnerable to landslides and floods. Toponimically, Duyu in the Kaili language means landslide.
These concerns had come true. The permanent housing in the Duyu site was hit by a flood on September 24, 2020. Some of the permanent housing’ constructions were damaged. Referring to the news published by Cipta Karya, one of the directorates under the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, the flood that hit permanent housing in Duyu location was due to the absence of hydrological studies of the area in the planning phase.
The absence of hydrological studies of the area in the planning phase of permanent housing’ construction in the Duyu location surely raised a big question. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing, who was in charge of the project implementation, seemed ignorant to consider the potential of disasters and their mitigations. This was ironic considering NSUP-CERC/CSRRP implemented by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing was aimed to build back better, build back safer, and sustainable.
Weak Coordination and Involvement of Local Government
NSUP-CERC/CSRRP was planned as a project that would involve all interested parties to collaborate. The management would apply the collaborative, integrative, participative, and inclusive principles; to manifest better, more secure, and sustainable rebuilding; by promoting good governance, and environmental and social management for a better livelihood. Other than to fulfill the public needs, this project was also designed to improve the capacity of the government’s partners and their implementations to ensure the quality of construction practices and standards compliance.
Regarding this matter, as a part of the document requested by the World Bank, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing had drafted SEP. In the SEP document, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing explained the coordination and involvement plans of various interested government agencies—national, provincial, and local—in the project preparation and implementation process. This coordination and involvement plans of various government agencies were strengthened in the Emergency Response Operations Manual (EROM) for NSUP-CERC and in the ESMF CSRRP.
In the ESMF document, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing had an assessment of institutional capacity (regarding roles and capacities) of government agencies that would be involved in the project implementation. Referring to this document, the Project Management Unit would provide directions, capacity improvements, and supervision for local government to implement ESMF for CERC activities. Sustainable capacity improvements would also be provided for (government) organizations regarding the preparation and implementation of safeguard aspects.
As a document, conceptually, SEP was well-drafted and consistent with ESS 10 as expected by the World Bank. Unfortunately, most of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing’s plans stated in this document, so far, had not been implemented. The Monitoring Team has not yet received any information on whether or not the Ministry of Public Works & Housing had conducted the capacity improvement process for government agencies as stated in the ESMF and EROM. Besides, we found that the coordination and communication process between the project implementer and the government agencies did not proceed as expected.
Coordination meetings between the Ministry of Public Works & Housing and local government were held quite frequently. However, from our findings in the field, which were then confirmed in the FGD, local government agencies with interest in the project’s planning and implementation tended to carry out their roles and duties without good coordination. They did not have the same perceptions and good understandings about NSUP-CERC/CSSRP. Some of them did not even have enough information, either related to the source of project funding, the organizational structure of project implementation, or how the project will be executed. They also considered that provision of the permanent housing project for disaster-affected communities was the domain and responsibility of the central government, therefore they tend to be passive and preferred not to be heavily involved.
As a consequence, the coordination and communication process between the Ministry of Public Works & Housing and the local government became weak, chaotic, and challenged. There was no clarity on the division of roles, tasks, and functions between the parties involved in the project implementation process, for example, roles division related to the process of drafting the LARAP (Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan) document.
The drafting process of LARAP, which was actually the task and responsibility of the local government, apparently had been “taken over” by the NMC Team, who was supposed to only provide specialists to give support and technical assistance. The confusion of tasks then occurred with the LARAP Facilitator Team under the NMC. LARAP Facilitator Team, which was supposed to ensure the participative and inclusive process to occur in the drafting and developing process of LARAP, was busier in collecting the data of DAPs who would be the permanent housing beneficiaries, which was the actual task of local government. Until July 2020, the drafting process of the LARAP document was still hampered.
Very weak coordination could also be seen in the land acquisition process. Almost all the lands proposed by the Government of Palu City for the permanent housing’ locations were problematic. Most of the lands prepared for the satellite permanent housing’ locations in Sigi District and Donggala District had also not been entirely set.
The local government would have full responsibility for land acquisition. In this case, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing would have a role in coordinating it with the Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi which would be involved in the process of land acquisition, due diligence, and would also be the mediator if there were claims on the lands proposed for the project.
The land acquisition would become a complicated and problematic challenge when the coordination between local government, the Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi, and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing run into serious problems. In fact, The Government of Palu City and the Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi already disagreed about the land area for the locations of permanent housing. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing considered that they were only users who would accept decisions regarding lands for the locations of permanent housing that had been designated by the local government and approved by the Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi. Each party felt that they had already done their roles and tasks according to their authorities.
Intensifying land conflicts in permanent housing’ location Talise Valangguni. apart from the absence of LARAP and LARPF, could not be separated from the weakness in coordination and communication between the Government of Palu City, Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi, and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. So far, these parties did not make any attempts or initiate to conduct a mediation process or further public consultation to resolve the problems. Therefore, the problems only got more serious and complicated when the Ministry of Public Works & Housing continued the land clearing even though they did not follow the procedure.
If these coordination and communication problems are not addressed quickly, problems related to land conflicts in other permanent housing’ locations will very likely rise as well. At least in Duyu, some people claim land ownerships. In Tondo, there are also indications that some lands for permanent housing’ locations were owned by people.
Another important note regarding the coordination and involvement of local government is that there is no involvement of local government agencies with interest in gender, GBV/SEA, and VAC issues. The Office of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (DP3A), both at the provincial level and district/city level was not identified as one of the stakeholders and was not listed as an institution to be considered according to capacity. DP3A Palu City admitted that they never been approached or involved with matters related to NSUP-CERC/CSRRP.
As an implication, throughout the project implementation, gender issues, especially GBV/SEA and VAC, did not get enough attention. We can say that the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, who run NSUP-CERC/CSRRP, were not serious and sincerely lived up to their commitments to put attention on gender issues, especially GBV/SEA and VAC.
Lack of Public Role and Participation
Referring to some policies related to disasters, the principle of participation is always used as the foundation and reference for implementation. Central Sulawesi Governor Regulation number 10 the Year 2019 about Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan clearly stated that the preparation of the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction plan will be carried out participative, inclusively, and involving all interested parties. The rehabilitation and reconstruction process will be conducted by mainstreaming gender equality, vulnerable groups, and people with disabilities.
NSUP-CERC/CSRRP was required to implement these principles. Additionally, the participative and inclusive principles were also emphasized by the World Bank as mandatory rules. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing, as the project implementer, was obligated to have public involvements, both in groups and individuals, from the preliminary process of project implementation. Public participation and involvement were not only limited to socialization, distributions, and disclosure of information. Moreover, the public should always be involved in the process of an in-depth consultation and decision making. The involvement of affected communities and vulnerable groups must also be a priority.
In the SEP document drafted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, the public participation process occupied a significant portion. The public participation hopefully would increase the project benefits and social acceptance. In this context, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing wanted to make sure that the project implementation was conducted participative and inclusively with high consideration to always respond to public needs. In the Ministry of Public Works & Housing plan, SEP would be applied as early as possible at the planning phase to ensure the public participation took place to get feedback from the public, and this feedback would be integrated as a part of the overall implementation approach. Public consultation would be held with all stakeholders.
In the context of public role and participation, again, there was a gap between the concept, planning, and implementation in the field. At least until July 2020—referring to the result of the questionnaire, interviews, and FGDs with DAPs and PAPs—there was a lack of public involvement in the phase of preparing the permanent housing construction project. There was no in-depth public consultation process to discuss and ensure that the project planning was conducted participative, inclusively, and the public could give feedback. The simplest thing, for example, the socialization and information distributions to the public, arguably stuck.
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing Facilitator Team indeed had conducted several socializations to share information about permanent housing project to DAPs. However, most of the DAPs who became monitoring respondents claimed that they rarely received any adequate socializations or information, either related to project planning and implementation in general or specific information (regarding the scheme of provided permanent housing, resettlement plan, mitigation steps, complaint mechanism, or related to livelihood, for example). As a consequence, some of the DAPs were confused, hesitated, and doubted the permanent housing’ construction project, even a number of them, so far, are still rejecting it.
Project-affected communities could be said that they barely got any attention. In Duyu, 19 people claimed ownership of the land set to be the location of permanent housing. Although these claimed lands had not been used by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, the status of the land should be immediately confirmed. Currently, there are still no updates on whether or not the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, the Government of Palu City, and Regional Office of ATR/BPN Central Sulawesi would invite the people who claimed ownership of these lands to have public consultation or other measures. The public has the right to get clarity and certainty, whether their lands remain a part of the permanent housing plan or not.
This lack of clarity and certainty had triggered land problems and conflicts in the permanent housing’ location Talise Valangguni. In this troubled location, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing had already cleared the land, some of them were the farmlands belonged to the people of Talise Valangguni, without prior approval and agreement with the community.
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing and the Government of Palu City claimed that they had already conducted some meetings and socialization to the public related to this land problem. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing even said that they had already identified 110 PAPs in the Talise Valangguni location, and they already offered some alternatives to these PAPs.
The monitoring Team received contrary information from PAPs. On the PAPs side, they felt like they did not get any clarity about socialization and the offer given. Even from the beginning, PAPs had already objected if their claimed farmlands would be used as the location of permanent housing.
Unfortunately, this public objection was not handled correctly! If there was an effort to handle it, the way chosen by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing was not relying on the procedure and mechanism which had been determined. The participation principle was nearly ignored. They did not pursue public dialogue and consultation with all objecting parties as stated in the project implementation guidelines and guidance (ESMF documents, both ESMF NSUP and ESMF CSRRP). In this case, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing immediately conducted land clearing and evicting people’s farmlands, even though the identification process had not been finished yet and there was no mutual agreement. Up to now, there is still no clarity whether the affected people whose farmlands were evicted will receive compensation or not.
Information socializations and distributions to DAPs and PAPs, if referring to SEP, were the task of the facilitator team. However, the facilitation team, activated by NSUP-CERC at the preliminary phase, apparently were busier in DAPs data collection which would be the permanent shelter beneficiaries. On the other hand, the NMC/TMC-CERC Team did not equip these facilitators with clear, detailed, and targeted project guidelines, guidance, and materials for public socialization and information. As the result, as admitted by some facilitators that we had been interviewed, they felt lost and confused when they had to conduct data collection and due diligence, arrange public socialization, facilitation, and organization, as well as to receive public complaints.
Lack of public role and participation in NSUP-CERC/CSRRP was also admitted by NMC-CERC Team in FGD. Related to gender and child protection issues, they did not even remap and coordinate with public institutions who worked on these issues, for example, women-friendly space and child-friendly space managed by various CSO or Women and Children Protection Task Force (Satgas PPA) and Integrated Community-Based Child Protection (PATBM) Forum under DP3A.
Another problem that surfaced was Feedback and Grievance Redress Mechanism (FGRM)—as mandated in ESS 10—was not socialized to the public and not well-managed as well. Both DAPs and PAPs practically did not know where to report grievances and complaints when they had issues related to NSUP-CERC/CSRRP.
At the implementation level, NSUP had PIM (Problems and Information Management) as FGRM. PIM then would also be appointed as FGRM for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP.
As a mechanism, PIM had provided methods and channels so the public could report easily. They even claimed that most of the reported grievances and complaints had been handled and taken care of. However, from our point of view, the extent of effectiveness of PIM for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP needs to be reviewed.
So far, we have found only one report from PIM NSUP-CERC for the period of September-November 2019 and no reports for other periods. We also have not found grievance and complaints report related to land problems in Talise Valangguni and the assurance of permanent housing’ locations for DAPs in Petobo or Lere which were often conveyed by the public and reported by the mass media.
We still do not know and we do not have enough information about why some of the cases that appear and are known by the public, in general, were not recorded in the PIM report. This underlies our view that PIM as FGRM for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP is needed to be reviewed. In our opinion, it would be better if FGRM for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP is created individually and separately from PIM NSUP, so all the reports would be accessible and not jumbled with other NSUP reports from other projects. Moreover, we have learned that the PIM mechanism did not assure how long complaints report would be handled and taken care of.
Lack of Attention towards Gender, Children, and People with Disabilities Issues
The World Bank pays serious attention to gender, Gender-Based Violence (GBV), Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA), and Violence against Children (VAC) issues. Out of ten ESSs, the World Bank guides gender contexts in six ESSs, namely ESS 1, ESS 2, ESS 4, ESS 5, ESS 7, and ESS 10. The World Bank has also drafted a Gender Strategy for the 2016-2023 period and Good Practice Note on Gender. The Good Practice Note is specifically aimed to address the gender gap in the ESF context and focusing on gender equality and inclusion, especially in the context of addressing the vulnerable groups, including GBV risks.
Problems related to gender issues, specifically GBV/SEA, had been identified in the environmental and social assessment NSUP-CERC/CSRRP and were considered necessary to have special attention, as well as issues related to children (including VAC) and people with disabilities. In addition to the ESMF CSRRP document, the attention towards these issues was also stated in the project assessment document, ESCP, and SEP. Social risks regarding GBV/SEA and VAC were classified as substantial for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP during disaster situations.
In the ESMF CSRRP document, this project had prepared the Strategies and Action Plans for GBV/SEA and VAC, complete with FGRM, the protocol on responding to case complaints and reports, and code of conduct. This Strategies and Action Plan elaborated a series of mitigation actions to (1) decrease the risks of GBV and VAC regarding CSRRP by providing training for project staff, (2) increase awareness about GBV and VAC and GBV services available for the public, especially those around the project area, (3) and ensure appropriate services were provided to the victims who reported or referred by service providers.
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing had promised to recruit specialists to understand the risks that arisen and determined corrective actions when those cases were identified and/or reported. Referral services for GBV/SEA would be informed to the public (especially to women) in targeted communities with the support of project facilitators to ensure that appropriate actions and/or support were available if there were cases that took place and reported. Facilitators would also ensure that the available FGRM channels were operational and credible for the public to report and/or file complaints in a safe and accessible manner.
At the document level, the concepts designed by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing for GVB/SEA and VAC mitigation were very promising. Unfortunately, as appeared in other findings, the strategies and action plans were still on paper. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing was not serious and determined to carry out their commitments that would focus on gender issues, specifically GBV/SEA and VAC.
Throughout our monitoring, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing initiated only one cross-sector meeting to discuss gender-responsive permanent housing. Other than that, there were no serious and concrete measures regarding strategies and action plans for GBV/SEA and VAC.
To date, there is no team from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing that has held a training regarding GBV/SEA and VAC to the staff, project workers, and the public; there are no efforts to increase awareness as well. From the discussion with civil society organization group who worked on gender issues, we find out that the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has never coordinated with them, some of which were previously mapped as service provider institutions. There are no clarities about the implementation of FGRM, handling protocols for complaints and case reporting, as well as services provided for GBV/SEA and VAC.
For us, this is something disturbing. In our view, the promising strategies and action plans are very likely to be implemented from the beginning. At least, as stated in ESCP and SEP, training and increasing awareness about GBV/SEA and VAC to the public and the workers of the permanent housing project in Duyu and Pombewe, for example, are supposed to be done. In the preliminary phase, in addition to coordinating, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing could remap the institutions (both government and CSO) that provided support and services related to gender issues, especially GBV/SEA and VAC. The remapping is also for assessing, collaborating, and—if necessary—adding capacities to these institutions. Therefore, FGRM and complaints protocol in the project could also be socialized, implemented earlier, and integrated with an available referral system.
In institutional capacity assessment, there are some local government agencies with interest in gender and people with disabilities issues that have not been listed as an institution to be considered according to capacity. The Office of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (DP3A) is one of them, although DP3A—both at the provincial level and city/district level—has an important role related to strategies and action plans for GBV/SEA and VAC. Despite its limited capacity and resources, DP3A is an institution that has been actively handled GBV/SEA and VAC cases. In our opinion, DP3A needs to be fully involved in these action plans. DP3A institutional capacity is also needed to be strengthened as do other institutions.
When we conducted FGD with a group consists of local government officials (among whom was attended by the Head of DP3A Palu City) and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing Team (attended by NMC Team and Bridging Team), we urged the need for coordination between the Ministry of Public Works & Housing Team and DP3A Palu City in regards to the measures that could be pursued together to mitigate GBV/SEA and VAC. At that time, NMC Team promised to meet and coordinate with DP3A Palu City later, but up to now, this meeting is still not happening.
To date, we have not found any news, reports, or complaints about GBV/SEA and VAC cases which directly related to the project. Throughout monitoring, we have only found two SEA cases that are not related to the project. Both cases involved girls as victims. Up to 2019, if referring to data owned by DP3A Central Sulawesi Province, GBV/SEA and VAC cases in Central Sulawesi, including in Palu, Sigi, and Donggala, from year to year tend to decrease.
However, as a common phenomenon, GBV/SEA and VAC cases that have been recorded and reported, represent only a small fraction of actual cases. Learning from the handling in emergency response period and transition period, the emergence of reports for GBV/SEA, VAC, and child marriage cases in post-disaster context is due to various institutions (both government and CSO) were working and actively conducting outreach, providing assistance, and monitoring.
This has become our concern. The decreasing cases and absence of reports for GBV/SEA and VAC cases related to the project do not mean that NSUP-CERC/CSRRP project can rule out GBV/SEA and VAC risks. We are indeed relieved by the absence of reported cases, but on the other hand, there are concerns that the institutions that were working and actively conducting outreach, providing assistance, and monitoring have decreased their activities. Moreover, COVID-19 pandemic has also limited activities in public areas.
Especially for children groups, we noted some troubling things during the COVID-19 pandemic. The online learning system conducted at home is not only impacting children’s learning pattern, it also transforms children’s interaction process in their environment. Since there are no school activities, the children are now roaming the streets. If the children regularly receive pocket money to buy snacks at school from their parents, now that they do not receive the pocket money anymore, they will try to find a way to have them.
From the discussions that we had with the board of PATBM Forum, there are some ways that children can do to earn pocket money. Some of them do it by being naughty: steal. Others choose to work, either doing it alone or with their parents. For those children who work with their parents, some of them work as a helper for construction workers. In Palu City and surrounding areas, the need for construction workers is on the rise since a lot of people are renovating and rebuilding their houses with the post-disaster stimulant fund Housing Financial Assistance (BDR).
These situations related to children should also be noticed by NSUP-CERC/CSRRP because they will have construction works shortly. Although NSUP-CERC/CSRRP have clear policies and guidelines about child labor, it is necessary and relevant for us to remind about the risks related to child labor.
Another note is the lack of attention towards people with disabilities. In the permanent housing location in Duyu and Pombewe, the planning and designs are not considering the importance of universal access. Permanent housing location in Duyu, which has more than 15% slope of the land, are not wheelchair-friendly. Universal access to water and sanitation is still unplanned. With the threat of flooding, as happened on September 24, 2020, permanent housing location in Duyu are considered to be less feasible for people with disabilities.
Throughout our monitoring, none of these permanent housings were specifically constructed for people with disabilities as beneficiaries. This, at least, shows that assessments, identifications, and data collections for permanent housing beneficiaries initially are not considering the existence of people with disabilities as a part of the beneficiaries. If we refer to ESS 1, the project implementer should be able to assess potential impacts, including different impacts on vulnerable individuals and groups, and to take specific measures to decrease potential risks and impacts.
We receive the latest information that shortly, 1,005 permanent housing units will be constructed for satellite resettlement and self-resettlement. Hopefully, the assessments, identifications, and data collections are improving and have already considering the existence of people with disabilities as a part of the beneficiaries. The planning and designs are expected not only to fulfill current needs but also considering the aspects of inclusivity which will be rewarding in the future.
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For the World Bank
- Ensure all policies, rules, and provisions stated in the ESF are being complied with and implemented, both by the Indonesian Government as a borrowing country and by the World Bank as a lending institution and policymaker. As a new vision of the World Bank, ESF will lose the spirit and objectives, as it cannot guarantee and ensure that the project will evade any irregularities, adverse impacts, and human rights violations if ESF is applied only at the normative level. Therefore, there must be clarity, certainty, and assertiveness in the form of sanctions or penalties if there are any violated policies, rules, and provisions.
- Ensure the involvement of all stakeholders with good intentions, not just formalities. Beneficiary communities, especially vulnerable groups (women, children, elderly people, people with disabilities) and disaster-affected communities must be ensured to receive clear, detailed, and in-depth information, and able to have active and meaningful participation in every decision-making process that is impacting their lives.
- Ensure all needed project documents be available immediately and can be easily accessed by the public as a part of information openness, including immediately inform the public if there are updated documents. Up to now, as a significant document for the project, the ESMF CSRRP document is still not available on the CSRRP-World Bank website, the storage for all CSRRP documents that are open to the public. These documents must also be available in Bahasa Indonesia, written in proper Bahasa Indonesia so they are easy to understand.
- Ensure the intentions, objectives, and implementation of the project are identified and implemented by the project executor and all stakeholders. Communication and coordination between the project executor and the stakeholders must be ensured to run properly and effectively. Therefore, the socialization and mainstreaming of project documents are very crucial to do so project implementer and all stakeholders have good perceptions and comprehensions regarding project implementation, as well as the division of their tasks, responsibilities, and roles.
- Ensure all the project planning and implementation have been based on disaster mitigation aimed to build back better, build back safer, and sustainable. Project planning and implementation which are careless and neglectful in considering the potential for disasters and its mitigation are unacceptable. This will only expose DAPs, as project beneficiaries, to hardships and even other disasters in the future.
- Ensure FGRM is operated and reported to the public periodically. The FGRM mechanism and reporting for NSUP-CERC/CSRRP must be created separately from the FGRM mechanism and reporting for NSUP to be easily accessed and monitored. FGRM mechanism must clearly inform the public and easily accessible, and also provide certainty regarding handling and resolutions.
- Take immediate measures and actions to handle and settle land disputes in a permanent housing location in Talise Valangguni to prevent more adverse and sustain impacts in the future. Dispute handling and resolutions must be ensured to use regulated policies, mechanisms, procedures, and principles. Dialogue approaches, participative public consultation, and mediation are more rewarding and providing certainty on project continuity rather than power-based approaches and deployment of security officers that tend to be regressive. Clarity and certainty about lands for permanent housing location in Duyu, which have not been used because there are still claims from the community, must be given immediately. Along with that, comprehensive assessments and evaluations must be redone for lands that have been prepared for permanent housing locations, especially lands with the potential to cause problems and disputes.
- Take required measures to specifically ensure the full and sincere attention towards vulnerable groups and the issues surrounding them. Women and children groups, who have high potentials and risks to encounter GBV/SEA and VAC, must be guaranteed to be safe and secure from adverse impacts of the project. Therefore, GBV/SEA and VAC strategies and action plans must be specifically drafted and separated from other FGRM. Collaborations between relevant institutions, both government and CSO, and competent individuals are very important so that the project implementation get support and actively conducting outreach, providing assistance, and monitoring in project areas. These collaborations are, at the same time, integrating service providers and ensuring those who experienced GBV/SEA and VAC will immediately get proper and comprehensive treatments.
For the Indonesian Government and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing as Project Implementer
- Comply with all stipulated policies, rules, and provisions, both by the Acts of Republic Indonesia and its rules of implementation and by the World Bank. To ensure such compliance, check and re-check at every phase needs to be done. All forms of noncompliance must be corrected, evaluated, and reported immediately.
- Ensure project planning and implementation are consistent with project objectives to build back better, build back safer, and sustainable. The construction of permanent housing and resettlement based on disaster mitigations are non-negotiable. Vulnerable groups with special needs must be prioritized and well-planned. The planning is not based on current needs but the needs in the distant future. The lack of planning will impact the beneficiary communities who later will face hardships and other disasters. Permanent housing in Duyu that was hit by the flood, which damaged some of the permanent housing’ construction, must be considered as an important lesson for the Ministry of Public Works & Housing in planning and mitigating the potential threats of disasters.
- Improve the performance of communication and coordination, especially with local government and other stakeholders. The project implementer and all stakeholders involved must have good perceptions and understandings regarding the intentions and objectives of the project, the guidance and guidelines, and respective roles, tasks, and responsibilities. Therefore, there is an urgency to increase the capacity of local government institutions. Project documents must also be available immediately to be socialized, understood, and co-referenced.
- Ensure the process of public consultation and participation process are always conducted at every phase of project implementation and occur without any problems. Inclusive dialogic spaces must always be opened, and, at the same time, ensure that the public inputs will be considered in the project planning and implementation. Clear, detailed, and accessible information must be available. Not only technical information but also information about project risks and impacts, as well as mitigation actions and handling efforts.
- Immediately implement the strategies and action plans for the mitigation of GBV/SEA and VAC. This mitigation must be done proactively by conducting sustainable outreach, providing assistance, and monitoring in project areas continuously. The collaboration with relevant agencies, both governmental agencies and CSOs, and competent individuals who have expertise are necessary. The availability of services that are accessible and adequate, as well as having the readiness and capabilities to handle people who experienced GBV/SEA and VAC properly and comprehensively, must be prioritized.
- Conduct FGRM and share the reports with the public periodically. FGRM mechanism must be well informed too and can be easily accessed by, the public, especially to and by DAPs and PAPs. Every feedback and complaints/grievance report must immediately be responded to and handled properly and effectively, and can provide solutions with clarity and certainty as well. FGRM for GBV/SEA and VAC, especially, must be handled immediately and separately from other FGRM. The complaints and handling protocols need to be updated by remapping the parties that will be involved in the handling process and integrating them with available service and referral agencies. Therefore, it is necessary to provide the resources, either individuals or teams, that specifically handle this matter.
For the Local Government
- Change the paradigm of thinking: the provision of permanent housing and public facilities are not an aid for the public, but a form of government responsibilities and obligations that must be completed to fulfill the rights of citizens. Getting proper housing is the basic right of citizens, especially disaster-affected communities who lost their homes and currently still living in temporary shelters. The government’s failure to fulfill those basic needs of disaster-affected communities can be categorized as a human rights violation, especially on the economic, social, and cultural rights.
- Position the public as valued subjects. The appreciations can be given by involving them participative and inclusively at every phase of the project implementation process, especially in every decision making that will affect their lives. Comprehensive information regarding permanent housing must be available and can be easily accessed by the public. The problem-solving process through dialogue approach, public consultation, and mediation must always be suggested; a power-based approach and deployment of security officers that tend to be regressive and threatening must be avoided and are not a favorable option.
- Improve the communication and coordination with the Ministry of Public Works & Housing as project implementer and other institutions involved in the provision of permanent housing. The collaboration with all parties with collaborative and integrative principles, as mandated by various policies, must be seriously considered as an obligation, including applying the good governance principles. Public interests and fulfillment of basic needs of disaster-affected communities must take precedence and be a priority.
- Utilize all resources to accelerate the effort of providing permanent housing, specifically to complete various data and documents that are still unavailable to date. It is urgent to address land acquisition problems and ensure the locations so the construction of permanent housing can be carried out immediately. Data of DAPs who were entitled to receive permanent housing, including disaggregated data for vulnerable groups, must be available immediately so the resettlement can be carefully planned. The resettlement framework must side with vulnerable groups.
- Ensure the action plans to mitigate GBV/SEA and VAC as well as the risks and adverse impacts that have the potential to arise during the construction of the permanent housing project. The capacities of available institutions and resources (UPTD PPA, PPA Task Force, PATBM) need to be empowered and strengthened. Therefore, collaboration with relevant CSO and competent individuals must be done, including preparing the availability of services.
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This report was researched and written by Moh. Syafari Firdaus, researcher and Head of Monitoring Team SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi for Permanent Housing NSUP- CERC/CSRRP in Central Sulawesi. Various data and field information included in this report were collected by Nurlaela Lamasitudju, Mohamad Herianto, and Ahmad Fauzi, also Adawiyah Lamasitudju, Rahmad Rahayu, and Dirham as enumerators.
This report was reviewed by Dicky Pelupessy, Ph.D., the Coordinator of Social Intervention Specialization, Master of Applied Psychology, Faculty of Psychology Indonesia University, and Coco Lammers, Children’s Right Campaign Manager at Bank Information Center (BIC), and Stefan Dinn, Program Assistant at Bank Information Center (BIC). This report is later translated into English by Yunita Lianingtyas.
SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi and Monitoring Team would like to thank all parties, both individuals and organizations, who have been involved in the process of monitoring and drafting this report. In particular, SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would like to thank the disaster-affected communities and project-affected communities who have shared information and submitted reports related to the process of provision of permanent housing, especially those conducted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would also like to thank the journalists, photographers, editors, and media who covered and published the news about the project implementation in providing permanent housing for disaster victims in Central Sulawesi. The Monitoring Team has gained a lot of enrichments from the news coverage and publishing. SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi and Monitoring Team would like to express our appreciation to the World Bank, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing (along with all the teams under NSUP-CERC/CSRRP), and the local government that has responded positively to our monitoring process. We appreciate the openness shown by all parties throughout this monitoring process. Lastly, SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would like to thank all parties, both individuals and institutions, who—from the disaster emergency response period up to the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process—have dedicated themselves and their institutions to assist the disaster management process on September 28, 2018, in Central Sulawesi. The people of Kaili land believe that “belo raelo belo rakava, belo raporia belo rakava”, if kindness is sought, then kindness will be gained; and all kind deeds will be rewarded with kind deeds as well.
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 This data refers to the Data and Information Finalization Report of Padagimo Earthquake, Tsunami, and Liquefaction Disaster released by the Provincial Government of Central Sulawesi on January 30, 2019.
 The draft of the application letter to activate CERC from the Minister of Finance of the Republic of Indonesia to the Country Director of World Bank in Jakarta can be seen in CERC-Emergency Response Operation Manual (EROM), Annex 2, p. 33. Besides, to activate CERC in NSUP, the Indonesian Government also activated CERC in Western Indonesia National Roads Improvement Project (WINRIP). The budget allocated for CERC-WINRIP is US$25 million.
 In addition to CSRRP, Indonesia also obtained another loan related to disasters from the World Bank: Indonesia Disaster Resilience Initiative Project (IDRIP). IDRIP was approved on November 19, 2019, for US$ 160 million with a five-year term of the loan. The executing agency of IDRIP is the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB).
 The World Bank has ten ESSs that have to comply. In the context of CSRRP, except ESS 9—Financial Intermediary, the World Bank asked the Indonesian Government to comply with the other nine ESSs. The comprehensive explanation about ESS can be read in the ESF document.
 ESCP document is a part of legitimate agreement documents with the World Bank. The borrowing country has to support the ESCP implementation. The World Bank obliges the borrowing country to be loyal to carry out the steps and actions that are identified in ESCP, according to the term specified in ESPC, and to observe the ESCP implementation status as a part of monitoring and reporting.
 SEP document gives an overview of CSRRP, stakeholder identification, and analysis, public consultation, complaint handling mechanism, and to elaborate the commitment to release regular information about the performance of environmental and social project management.
 The details of permanent housing for relocation scheme that have been constructed and still in construction are as follows: 1,500 units in Tondo and 500 units in Pombewe were constructed by Buddha Tzu Chi, 75 units in Tondo were constructed by AHA Center, 11 units in Tondo were constructed by APEKSI, 127 units in Balaroa were constructed by the Government of Palu City, 230 units in Duyu and 400 units in Pombewe were constructed by Ministry of Public Works & Housing, and 39 units in Mamboro were constructed by Yayasan Arkom Indonesia.
 Three initial reports have been written by the Monitoring Team: Permanent Housing, Ministry of Public Works & Housing, and World Bank Regulations, Permanent Housing and Its Problems, and The Complicated Relocation Action Plans. These three reports are available to read and downloaded on our website: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org.
 FGDs were conducted between July 21 to 23, 2020.
 A detailed explanation regarding the World Bank’s policies and rules for NSUP-CERC/ CSRRP project can be read in our previous report: Permanent Housing, Ministry of Public Works & Housing, and World Bank Regulations.
 We asked the Head of BP2W Central Sulawesi to confirm the reasons why the security officers were deployed. He explained that the deployment of security officers was “only” to protect the construction workers and to anticipate the public outrage.
 Nunu and Tavanjuka are neighboring two sub-districts in Palu City. These two sub-districts are popular for their feuds and often trigger public conflicts.
 The requirement for AMDAL or UKL-UPL documents will be based on the project scale. For activities or projects that require AMDAL, the reference is Ministry of Environment Regulations Number 5 the Year 2012; as for projects that require UKL-UPL documents, the reference is Ministry of Environment Regulations Number 16 the Year 2012.
 This document consists of two volumes and available in English and Bahasa Indonesia versions. On the cover of the Bahasa Indonesia version, there is a note: Final – November 2019.
 See ESMF CSRRP, Vol. I, p. 55.
 This statement was from the Head of BP2W Central Sulawesi, Ferdinand Kana Lo, responding to the action of the people from Talise Valangguni who objected to land clearing conducted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. One of the news can be read on this link: https://www.sultengnews.com/ pembangunan-huntap-iii-talise-dihentikan-jika-ada-perintah-wali-kota-palu/. The Head of BP2W Central Sulawesi stated a similar thing in a discussion with Monitoring Team.
 See ESMF NSUP p. 30-41; ESMF CSRRP Vol. II especially Sub-Appendix 8.3, p. 67-69.
 Various policies mandated affirmative action towards vulnerable groups. After learning from the mechanism in determining the permanent housing allocation by “drawing lottery”, as conducted for permanent housing’ allocation for Buddha Tzu Chi, in our opinion, needs to be corrected. Resettlement policy by “drawing lottery” will ignore the interests of vulnerable groups with special needs.
 The completion of permanent housing’ construction in both locations has been delayed a couple of times. Initially scheduled to be completed in April 2020, then delayed to September 2020, and now postponed to December 2020.
 We mentioned and discussed this with Andre A. Bald, Team Leader of NSUP dan CSRRP from the World Bank when we met him in late January 2020.
 http://sim.ciptakarya.pu.go.id/sipkp/berita/p/huntap-palu-relokasi-berbasis-mitigasi-bencana, accessed on September 26, 2020.
 EROM, par. 55, p. 24.
 ESMF CSRRP Vol. II, Appendix 8, p. 45.
 Explanation about the constraint in drafting the LARAP can be read in our previous report The Complicated Relocation Action Plans especially in the part Land Acquisition Policy and the Relocation Planning.
 Coordination between the Ministry of Public Works & Housing Team (through NSUP-CERC Bridging Team) with LARAP City/District Team now has been fixed. We acquire information that the drafting of LARAP documents is now in the finalization process.
 The stipulation of permanent housing’ locations proposed by the Government of Palu City and the Government of Sigi District are stated in the Decree of the Governor of Central Sulawesi Number 369/516/DIS.BMPR-G.ST/2018 dated December 28, 2018, about the Stipulation of Resettlement Locations for Natural Disaster Recovery.
 Further explanation about this can be read in part Key Finding 5, Lack of Attention towards Gender, Children, and People with Disabilities Issues.
 So far, the Monitoring Team does not know whether the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has any notes, reports, or minutes of these meetings and socializations or not. The obligation to write notes, reports, and minutes of the meeting are stated in ESMF.
 If referring to ESMF CSRRP Vol. II, Sub-appendix 8.5 (p. 75), field test and consultation are needed to identify potential risks related to the use or ownership of informal land. This applies to all lands without considering the administrative status of the land transfer process. Public consultation with WTP should be done at the construction site (ESMF CSRRP Vol. II, Sub-appendix 8.3, p. 67; see also ESMF NSUP document, Diagram 2, p. 32).
 Starting from August 2020, with a new facilitator team formed by NSUP-CERC Bridging Team, we see an improvement in the performance of these facilitators on dealing with the communities at the project areas, especially with DAPs. DAPs in various locations are starting to be frequently involved in the planning and preparation process of permanent housing.
 FGRM is the mechanism of complaints, process, or procedure to accept and facilitate problems and grievance resolution for the affected parties which have arisen because of the project, especially about environmental and social performance. Other than ESS 10, FGRM is also stated in ESS 2, ESS 5, and ESS 7.
 ESMF CSRRP Vol. I, p. 61-63,
 ESMF NSUP, appendix 33, p. 165.
 The World Bank’s Good Practice Note about GBV guides risk management regarding sexual exploitation and violence/harassment that have the potential to arise in the context of a project that involved a lot of civil workers.
 ESMF CERC Vol. II, Appendix 11, p. 118-126.
 Reading ESMF CSRRP (Vol. II, Sub-Appendix 11.1, p. 127-132) document, service institutions, which were mapped in July 2019, need to be updated. Women friendly space and child-friendly space managed by CSOs during disasters emergency response period and transition period also need to be reidentified whether they are still active or not. Moreover, the Integrated Service Center for Empowering Women and Children (P2TP2A) is replaced with the Regional Technical Implementation Unit for the Protection of Women and Children (UPTD PPA). In Center Sulawesi, UPTD PPA is under the Office of Women Empowerment and Child Protection (DP3A) and so far, is only available at the provincial level. At the city and district level, this unit has not yet been formed. Palu City and Sigi District, for example, only have Women Empowerment and Child Protection (PPA) Task Force which works at the community level besides PATBM Forum.
 ESMF CSRRP Vol. II, Appendix 2, p. 6-11.
 The second case that we received was submitted by NSUP-CERC Bridging Team. We appreciate the Bridging Team for their quick response. They immediately coordinated with us and reported it to DP3A Palu City.
 As stated in ESMF CSRRP Vol. II, Toolkit, Appendix 9: Workforce Management Procedure, p. 79-102, specifically p. 84-85.