The reconstruction and rehabilitation process after the September 28, 2018 disaster in Central Sulawesi currently is still ongoing. The provision of permanent housing to relocate Warga Terdampak Bencana–WTB (Disaster-Affected People–DAP) is one of the unresolved problems in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process. In the initial calculation done by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, the total amount of permanent housing required is 11,788 units. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing planned to build 8,788 units, while the remaining 3,000 units would be built by other parties.
To provide the relocation permanent housing in Central Sulawesi, the Indonesian Government applied for a loan to the World Bank, with the Ministry of Public Works & Housing through the Directorate General of Housing Provision as to the executor.
Based on the plan, the provision of permanent housing would be implemented in two phases:
- Phase 1, as the transition or initial phase, was conducted through National Slum Upgrading Project-Contingency Emergency Response Component (NSUP-CERC) with a budget of US$ 100 million. In this phase, it was planned to build 1,600 units of permanent housing.
- Phase 2, was conducted through Central Sulawesi Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (CSRRP). CSSRP aimed to reconstruct and strengthen the structure of public facilities and housing to make them safer in disaster-affected areas. The amount of loan from the World Bank for CSSRP was US$ 150 million. In phase 2, it was planned to build 7,188 units of permanent housing.
Three years post-disaster, up until mid-September 2021, the provision of relocation permanent housing for the DAP is not even halfway done. From the initial plan of 11,788 units of relocation permanent housing, only 3,272 units are built and ready for habitation. There are more than 6,000 households in Palu, Sigi, and Donggala who until now still have not had clarity and certainty about their right to permanent housing.
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing so far has only been able to build 630 units which consist of 230 units in Duyu, Palu City, and 400 units in Pombewe, Sigi District. While in fact, the Central Sulawesi Government Regulation Number 10 the Year 2019 about Post-Disaster Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Plan has mandated that the aid and provision of permanent housing for the DAP should be finished in less than 2.5 years.
SKP HAM Central Sulawesi, supported by Bank Information Center (BIC), has intensively monitored the provision of permanent housing for the DAP. The monitoring process is focused on the permanent housing project executed by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing through NSUP-CERC and CSRRP which is funded by the World Bank.
The monitoring has been conducted from January 2020. So far, the SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi Monitoring Team has published several notes and reports. This report is the continuation of previous reports to complete the monitoring report for the period of January-September 2020 which has been published.
In the previous monitoring report, there were five issues that we highlighted and became key findings regarding the execution of NSUP-CERC and CSRRP. Those five key findings were (1) as a policy, the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) was only normatively binding the borrowing country, (2) main documents needed for project execution were not fully completed and finished, (3) weak coordination and involvement of local government, (4) lack of public roles and participation, and (5) Lack of attention towards gender, children, and people with disabilities issues.
Based on our monitoring from October 2020 to September 2021, those five issues have still emerged as key issues that need to get serious attention in the execution by the project executor. Except for the involvement of the local government, which is currently showing little progress by facilitating community discussion forums in several locations of permanent housing reconstruction, other issues are still not showing any significant changes.
In the following monitoring process, we found three additional key issues to raise. These three issues are (1) NSUP-CERC and CSRRP are progressing very slowly, (2) the emergence of adverse impacts as consequences of the very slowly progressing project, and (3) the World Bank has failed to enforce its own policies and regulations.
We will thoroughly explain these three issues in the Key Findings section of this report.
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NSUP-CERC and CSRRP is Progressing Very Slowly
The Ministry of Public Works & Housing began the work of NSUP-CERC after there was an addendum to the agreement with the World Bank to reallocate the fund in October 2019. The construction of permanent housing Phase 1A began in January 2020. As many as 630 units of permanent housing would be built in two locations: 230 units in Duyu, Palu City, and 400 units in Pombewe, Sigi District. However, two years after the project execution started, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has only built 630 units of permanent housing Phase 1A-CERC in these two locations. The provision of public facilities and social facilities in these two locations of permanent housing construction is not fully completed.
Contractually, the construction of permanent housing Phase 1A was supposed to be completed in six months, starting from January 2020 to early July 2020. The fact is that the completion of the construction of permanent housing Phase 1A took longer than that, and finally be completed in March 2021. This means that there was a delay of more than eight months! In total, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing needed more than 14 months to finish the construction of 630 units of permanent housing in these two locations.
The potential delay is also lurking in the construction of permanent housing Phase 1B-CERC that currently is ongoing. In Phase 1B, it was planned to build 1,005 units. This construction of permanent housing is still ongoing but only for 976 units in 10 satellite locations of permanent housing, with 45 units of which are independent permanent housing.
The construction of Phase 1B began in October 2020 with the execution time planned for 264 days. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing had promised to complete 700 units of permanent housing in Phase 1B at the end of June 2021, and the entire construction of permanent housing Phase 1B would be completed in mid-December 2021.
This construction of permanent housing is indeed progressing very slowly (almost crawling!). Up until mid-September 2021, after 11 months of execution, there has not been a single unit of permanent housing Phase 1B that is ready for habitation. PT Waskita, as the contractor, said that the progress of constructing the permanent shelter Phase 1B in satellite locations of Ganti and Tanjung Padang, Donggala District, for example, has only reached 60%. The entire completion of permanent housing Phase 1B, which was targeted in December 2021, is potentially delayed.
The COVID-19 pandemic is indeed one of the factors that contributed to this delay. However, at the beginning of the pandemic, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing felt confident that they would be able to finish the construction of permanent housing according to plan.
Apart from this, the process of permanent housing construction, which is funded by CERC (Phase 1A and 1B), there are no more problems related to land as it is an underlying problem for the construction of permanent housing Phase 2 (CSRRP). Before the construction of permanent housing Phase 1A and 1B began, they made sure that the land was cleared!
From our point of view, the delay of permanent housing construction funded by CERC, both Phase 1A, and Phase 1B, is solely due to the incompetence of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing in managing the project. The delay in construction of permanent housing Phase 1A did not seem to motivate the Ministry of Public Works & Housing to immediately conduct a review and evaluation. Instead of using the delay in Phase 1A as learning materials, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing was repeating the same mistakes while executing the construction of permanent housing Phase 1B.
Unfortunately, no party had firmly rebuked, pushed, and evaluated the performance of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, so they would complete the construction of permanent housing faster. Likewise, no parties had asked for accountability from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing as the project executor for the delay of construction of the permanent housing. The World Bank seemed to overlook this delay as well and assumed that the project of permanent housing construction funded by their loan was going well.
The World Bank, in a published report, actually acknowledged that the progress of the permanent housing project was slower than expected. However, in that same report, the World Bank gave a “quite satisfactory” assessment for the progress of the project execution generally. 
It should be emphasized that CERC was not intended to be a long project. As stated in the Addendum for CERC per October 13, 2019, the intention of CERC is to support the direct priority activities (less than 26 months). Referring to the promises and statements from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing that the overall execution of Phase 1B-CERC will be completed by December 2021, then it can be said that CERC has failed to achieve its objectives.
The slow progress was not only happening in Phase 1-CERC. The construction of permanent housing Phase 2-CSRRP more or less has shown similar indications. Phase 2-CSRRP, referring to the original plan, still has to build 7,000 units of permanent housing. For the large-scale area of permanent housing, so far the execution process has only reached the land clearing and development at the Tondo II and Talise locations. In the initial phase, the process of land clearing and development at these two locations has created some problems, and could also be considered to violate the established mechanisms, procedures, and rules.
Although the LARAP (Land Acquisition and Resettlement Action Plan) document as well as the Upaya Pengelolaan Lingkungan Hidup–UKL (Environmental Management Efforts) and Upaya Pemantauan Lingkungan Hidup–UPL (Environmental Monitoring Efforts) documents have not yet been completed, the construction of permanent housing in Tondo II and Talise locations is rumored to be conducted in October 2021. The construction of independent permanent housing and satellite permanent housing that spread, at least, four locations, is currently still in the auction process. There is no certainty when the construction will be conducted.
The addition of a new permanent housing location for Petobo’s DAP has been prepared by the Palu City Government. The location of the permanent housing is predicted to be a part of CSRRP. It is still uncertain when the construction of permanent housing in the location will be conducted. It should be noted that before conducting the construction of permanent housing in the new location, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has to conduct the land feasibility study, draft the LARAP and UKL-UPL documents, acquire the NOL (no-objection letter) from the World Bank, design a site-plan, conduct land clearing and development, as well as open auctions for contractors to handle the permanent housing construction. This will take a relatively long time. The Petobo’s DAP who choose the permanent housing in this location has to prepare themselves to wait longer.
Referring to the reconstruction process of 630 units of permanent housing in Phase 1A, which needed more than 14 months time, and 976 units of permanent housing in Phase 1B, that at least needed 14 months to complete, the question is, how long will it take to build around 7,000 units of permanent housing in Phase 2? This question should be answered immediately so the DAP will soon have certainty about when they will be able to acquire the permanent housing to which they are entitled.
The Adverse Impacts Due to the Slow Progress of Provision of Permanent Housing
The slow progress of provision and construction of permanent housing by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has triggered some adverse impacts. We note that, at least, there were three things that have already and have the potential to emerge as adverse impacts because of this delay.
The DAP experienced health problems, physically and mentally
The DAP is the most affected by the delay in the provision of permanent housing. Three years post-disaster, there are still so many DAPs living in temporary shelters. There are also many DAPs who have lost their habitation because their temporary shelters have been demolished.
The DAP has lived in the temporary shelters for more than two years. Most of the temporary shelters they live in are no longer fit for habitation. Such conditions make the DAP are more vulnerable to experiencing health problems.
The vulnerability of DAP is not only in the form of physical health problems, but also prone to mental health problems. Referring to the result of assessments done by Sejenak Hening (A Moment of Silence), an institution that works in the mental health field, currently, some of the DAP have shown the symptoms of emotional instability. The DAP in Petobo who live in temporary shelters, for example, 41% of them indicated anxiety disorder with 37% of which indicated mild-moderate depression. If they do not receive treatments immediately, these DAPs will have the potential to experience more serious mental health disorders.
Have the potential to trigger social conflicts
The DAP is haunted by anxiety and fear that their temporary shelters will be demolished at any time in the future because the land-use period has expired. They also harbor resentments, disappointments, and anger, not only to the government who only seem to give promises but also to the landowners who now intend to take back their lands.
Some landowners are still willing to lend their lands as temporary shelters location until the DAP have their permanent housing. This had happened in Tompe, Donggala District, for example. However, in other locations, the temporary shelters were forcefully demolished. This had happened in Dongkala Kodi, Palu City. In other cases, landowners who wanted to take back their lands were rejected by the DAP who inhabit the temporary shelters.
The resentments and anger of DAP are understandable. First, if the temporary shelters are demolished, they will no longer have a place to live and become homeless. Second, they have waited for too long to acquire the permanent housing to which they are entitled, but so far they only get promises. Third, now the DAP are not only survivors of disaster anymore. Because their rights have been ignored and violated, they suffer another victimization.
The unexpected thing happened: the DAP expressed their resentments and anger in violence. So far, there were no acts of violence have triggered social conflicts. The DAP was only holding several demonstrations to demand their rights. In the last one, on September 27, 2021, the police arrested five people and they had to spend a day in detention.
This situation requires serious attention and mitigation. If the government does not fulfill its promises soon and does not give certainty about the availability of permanent housing, then social conflicts and serious adverse impacts will likely happen.
The potential for human rights violations
As the holder of the obligation who is responsible for fulfilling the rights of its citizens, the local government has failed to implement the mandate of the Central Sulawesi Governor Regulation No. 10/2019 which stated to provide permanent housing for DAP in less than 2,5 years. Failure to implement this mandate has further potential for human rights violations (violations of economic, social, and cultural rights).
The principle of human rights states that the fulfillment/violation of one of the rights will be interrelated and dependent on the fulfillment/violation of other rights. In the context of the unfulfillment of permanent housing for DAP, the government has not only violated the rights of citizens to obtain decent housing. Moreover, the government will have the potential to violate, among others, the right to a decent living, the right to a safe and comfortable environment, and the right to health.
Therefore, local governments (both provincial and city/district) must immediately find solutions to overcome this problem. They cannot allow the DAP to live in the temporary shelters in a sad state of affairs, especially for the DAP who currently have no place to live, who might have been neglected and abandoned. The local government must strive to fulfill a decent life guarantee for the DAP, or at least, for the DAP to live properly and not be neglected.
Meanwhile, because all DAP who are entitled to permanent housing are the beneficiaries of NSUP-CERC and CSRRP, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing must also take responsibility for the consequences of their inaction and delay. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing, together with the local government, must assume responsibility together to fulfill the rights of the DAP because of promises not being delivered on time.
The World Bank has Failed to Enforce Its Own Policies and Regulations
On October 1, 2018, the World Bank has effectively implemented the Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) to replace the Safeguard Policies. The World Bank campaigns the ESF as a vision for sustainable development. The objectives of the ESF is to ensure that the public and the environment will be protected from the various potential adverse impacts caused by the projects it funded.
The World Bank obliges every borrowing country to comply with the ESF in every project funded by them. The ESF is listed in the agreement as one of the things that the borrowing country must comply with and implement. The borrowing country then will place the ESF provisions in the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP) document, which is drafted in accordance with the ten Environmental and Social Standards (ESS) that have been determined by the World Bank.
In the key findings in the previous monitoring report, we have expressed that the compliance and implementation of the World Bank’s ESF, it seems, only applies in the “normative” level. In the context of the CSRRP loan agreement between the World Bank and the Government of Indonesia, for example, there is no clause related to sanction or penalty if the Government of Indonesia, as the borrowing country, does not comply nor implement the provisions stated in the ESF.
Therefore, no matter how ideal the borrowing country has to draft the ESCP document that is consistent with ESF, eventually, this commitment plan has a possibility to not be implemented. As further consequences, ESF might lose the spirit and objectives as it cannot guarantee and ensure that the project will evade any irregularities, adverse impacts, and human rights violations.
From our monitoring during the NSUP-CERC and CSRRP projects, the neglect of policies and regulations has become increasingly apparent. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing, in executing this project, was far from compliant to implement the ESF and ESS mandates. The committed plan, as stated by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing in the ESCP, was partially not implemented. Related to the availability of supporting documents, for example. LARAP document, UKL-UPL documents, Feedback and Grievance Redress Mechanism (FGRM), and guidelines for implementing the Strategy and Action Plans for Gender-Based Violence (GBV)/ Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) and Violence against Children (VAC) that were required because they would serve as guidelines for executing the project, we're often late or not immediately drafted.
So far, we have not received a firm and clear response from the World Bank when we tried to recommend directly regarding the obligation of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing to comply with the World Bank's policies and regulations as a lender. The World Bank also seemed to dodge when asked to ensure that key commitments, which obliged to be applied, to be implemented immediately. Implementation for GBV/SEA and VAC strategies and action plans, for example. After two years of the project execution, there were no concrete steps taken to implement the GBV/SEA and VAC strategies and action plans. While in fact, the World Bank pays full and special attention to gender, GBV/SEA, and VAC. Out of the ten ESS, the World Bank provides guidance on gender context in six ESS, namely ESS 1, ESS 2, ESS 4, ESS 5, ESS 7, and ESS 10. In particular, the World Bank has also drafted a Gender Strategy for the 2016-2023 period. The same thing happened to the concept of universal access and inclusive design: none of these had been implemented at the construction site of permanent housing.
The World Bank gave, more or less, a similar response in responding to the case of land clearing at the permanent housing’ location Talise-Valangguni, Palu City, which process clearly violated the policies and regulations because it was conducted by force or repression. The Ministry of Public Works & Housing has violated the World Bank’s policies and regulations, as stated in ESF, ESS, ESCP, Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), NSUP, and ESMF CSRRP.
Moreover, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing has violated the Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 2 the Year 2012 regarding Land Acquisition for Development in the Public Interest, which is also a policy reference for the implementation of NSUP-CERC and CSRRP.
In the case of land clearing at the permanent housing’ location Talise-Valangguni, the World Bank did not take any measures and actions, or, at least, provide recommendations to the Ministry of Public Works & Housing for proper settlement. The World Bank seemed to avoid, waive, and ignore, even though blatant violations had occurred.
So was the slow progress of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing in providing permanent housing. The World Bank, in a published report, actually gave a “quite satisfactory” assessment for the progress of the project execution generally, although they acknowledged that the progress of the provision of permanent housing’ project was slower than expected. For us, the assessment provided by the World Bank not only showed that they had low expectations for this project. Moreover, the World Bank had ignored the adverse effects on DAP caused by the project they funded.
We had directly pressed the World Bank regarding the responsibility of project executor to the DAP who have not yet received permanent housing, who lived improperly in temporary shelters and were very likely to have been neglected due to the slow progress of provision of permanent housing. Unfortunately, the World Bank did not feel compelled to take part in shouldering these responsibilities and obligations. The World Bank also did not give any kind of reasoning or recommendation to solve the problem.
The gesture shown by the World Bank is contradictory to the spirit and objectives of the ESF, which campaigned as a vision for sustainable development and to ensure that people and the environment can be protected from the potential adverse impacts caused by the projects they funded. Now, when the adverse impacts caused by NSUP-CERC and CSRRP have loomed in sight, the World Bank turns away and “washes their hands”.
From our perspective, the World Bank's responses to the problems that arose in the NSUP-CERC and CSRRP projects have shown that the World Bank is not serious in ensuring that this project can be conducted properly, which is subject to and complies with policies and regulations. The World Bank is not only “normative” in applying ESF requirements as policies and regulations to the borrowing country. Moreover, the World Bank has actually failed to implement and enforce its own policies and regulations!
Safeguard policies, ESF, or whatever they are called, are only meant to exist as documents, and it does not matter how they are implemented in the field. So is the expression, “build back better, build back safer, and sustainable”, as the objective of the NSUP-CERC and CSRRP projects. It appears to exist only on paper and is simply echoed as empty jargon.
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- Comply with all established policies and regulations. To ensure compliance conducts check and re-check at every phase of the process. Any form of non-compliance must be immediately corrected, evaluated, and reported. This does not only apply to the Ministry of Public Works & Housing as the project executor, but also to the World Bank as the financial institution that provides funds.
- Improve the performance to be more effective and efficient, as well as constantly reviewing and evaluating. The completion of the construction of the permanent housing must be confirmed so that the DAP, who are entitled to the permanent housing, have the certainty when they will inhabit the permanent housing. The delay in the construction of permanent housing, as happened in Phase 1A and Phase 1B, is not only unacceptable but must be acknowledged and seen as something of a shame. The delay in the provision of permanent housing will only expose the DAP to longer waiting and suffering.
- Ensure that all the project planning and execution are based on disaster mitigation aimed to build back better, build back safer, and be sustainable. Careless planning and execution of this project and neglecting to consider potential disasters and their mitigations are totally unacceptable. This will only expose DAP, who receive permanent housing, to hardships and, even more, to other disasters in the future.
- Ensure that all required project documents be available immediately, can be easily accessed by the public as part of information disclosure, including immediately informing, socializing, and consulting the public to be understood and used as a common reference.
- Ensure that the process of public consultation and community participation are always conducted at every phase of project execution and occur without any obstacles. Inclusive dialogue spaces must always be opened, and at the same time, ensure that public inputs will be considered and taken into account in the project planning and execution. Clear, detailed, and easily accessible information to the public must be available. Not only technical information but also information about project risks and impacts, as well as mitigation actions and handling efforts.
- Pay attention to vulnerable groups who have special needs and various issues surrounding them must be prioritized and well-planned, including immediately integrating the concept of universal access and inclusive design. The planning is not only based on current needs but also has to take future needs into account.
- Groups of women and children, who have high potentials and risks to encounter GBV/SEA and VAC, must be guaranteed to be protected and safe from the adverse impacts of the project. Therefore, it is necessary to immediately implement strategies and action plans for the mitigation and handling of GBV/SEA and VAC.
- GBV/SEA and VAC risk mitigation must be conducted proactively by conducting outreach, mentoring, and monitoring in project areas on an ongoing and continuous basis. Cooperation with various relevant institutions, both government institutions and civil society organizations, CSOs, and individuals who have the competence and expertise is absolutely necessary. Availability of accessible and adequate referral mechanisms and services, as well as having the readiness and ability to deal with those experiencing GBV/SEA and VAC appropriately and comprehensively, should be prioritized.
- Complement the existing FGRM mechanism. FGRM must be well informed too and can be easily accessed by, all public, especially to and by DAP and Warga Terdampak Proyek–WTP (Project-Affected People). Every feedback and complaint/grievance report must immediately be responded to and handled properly and effectively and can provide solutions with clarity and certainty as well.
- FGRM for GBV/SEA and VAC, especially, must be handled immediately and separately from other FGRM. The complaints and handling protocols need to be updated by remapping the parties that will be involved in the handling process and integrating them with available service and referral agencies. Therefore, it is necessary to provide the resources, either individuals or teams, that specifically handle this matter.
- Establish a Special Work Unit for the Acceleration of Provision of Permanent Housing at the Provincial Level. Problem-related to the provision of permanent shelters is not only land disputes, but also (among others) will be intertwined with issues of data collection, civil service, population administration, employment, gender mainstreaming, strengthening vulnerable groups, and post-inhabitation. This requires special attention and intensive joint work from many parties. In this context, the Government of Central Sulawesi Province needs to be proactive in taking the role and authority to lead, facilitate, coordinate, and collaborate on the work conducted by various parties in order to accelerate the execution of the provision of permanent housing program and minimize the emergence of other problems in the future. This work unit will also monitor the performance of the Ministry of Public Works & Housing as the executor of the NSUP-CERC and CSRRP projects.
- The local government and the Ministry of Public Works & Housing must immediately fulfill their obligations to assume responsibility for ensuring that the DAP, who are entitled to permanent housing, both those currently living in temporary shelters and those who no longer have a place to live, get the decent life guarantee, or at least, for the DAP to live properly and not be neglected.
- The World Bank must immediately take accurate and concrete measures—not just turn away and “wash their hands”—to mitigate and address the emergence of potential adverse impacts caused by the projects they funded.
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This report was researched and written by Moh. Syafari Firdaus, researcher and Head of Monitoring Team SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi for Permanent Housing NSUP- CERC/CSRRP in Central Sulawesi. Various data and field information included in this report were collected by Nurlaela Lamasitudju, Mohamad Herianto, and Ahmad Fauzi, also Adawiyah Lamasitudju, Rahmad Rahayu, and Dirham as enumerators.
This report was reviewed by Dicky Pelupessy, Ph.D., the Coordinator of Social Intervention Specialization, Master of Applied Psychology, Faculty of Psychology Indonesia University, and Sofia Dinn, Program Assistant at Bank Information Center (BIC). This report is later translated into English by Yunita Lianingtyas.
SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi and Monitoring Team would like to thank all parties, both individuals and organizations, who have been involved in the process of monitoring and drafting this report. In particular, SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would like to thank the disaster-affected communities and project-affected communities who have shared information and submitted reports related to the process of provision of permanent housing, especially those conducted by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing. SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would also like to thank the journalists, photographers, editors, and media who covered and published the news about the project implementation in providing permanent housing for disaster victims in Central Sulawesi. The Monitoring Team has gained a lot of enrichments from the news coverage and publishing.
SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi and Monitoring Team would like to express our appreciation to the World Bank, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing (along with all the teams under NSUP-CERC/CSRRP), and the local government that has responded positively to our monitoring process. We appreciate the openness shown by all parties throughout this monitoring process.
Lastly, SKP-HAM Central Sulawesi would like to thank all parties, both individuals and institutions, who—from the disaster emergency response period up to the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process—have dedicated themselves and their institutions to assist the disaster management process on September 28, 2018, in Central Sulawesi. The people of Kaili land believe that, “belo raelo belo rakava, belo raporia belo rakava”, if kindness is sought, then kindness will be gained; and all kind deeds will be rewarded with kind deeds as well.
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 In the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Central Sulawesi, the Ministry of Public Works & Housing is not only the executor of permanent housing’s reconstruction funded by the World Bank through NSUP-CERC (US$ 100 million) and CSRRP (US$ 150 million) but also the roadworks through WINRIP (US$ 25 million). The Ministry of Public Works & Housing is also the executor of Infrastructure Reconstruction Sector Loan (IRSL) Central Sulawesi funded by Japan International Cooperation Agency–JICA (JPN¥ 27.97 million) and Emergency Assistance for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction (EARR) funded by Asian Development Bank–ADB (US$ 279,75 million). All these fundings are loans. The total funding through loan scheme managed by the Ministry of Public Works & Housing for the post-disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Central Sulawesi is around US$ 805 million or no less than Rp 11,27 trillion.
 All the monitoring notes and reports can be accessed through our website: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/category/laporan-pemantauan/. The monitoring report for the period of January-September 2020 can be read and downloaded from the following link: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=3300 (English version) and https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=3218 (Bahasa Indonesia version).
 As stated by Rezki Agung, the Head of Specific Non-Vertical Work Units (SNVT) of Housing Provision Central Sulawesi, as the institution responsible for the construction of permanent housing in Central Sulawesi. The news article can be read in the following link: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=3786.
 If within 11 months they were only able to reach 60% completion, with a simple calculation, they will need seven additional months to finish this phase entirely. Based on the current progress, we suspect that the construction of permanent housing Phase 1B (CERC) will be completed entirely in April 2022.
 The statements from the Ministry of Public Works & Housing regarding the topic can be read in the following news links: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=2314 and https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=2309.
 The report in question is the Implementation Status and Result Report (ISR), published by the World Bank on June 4, 2021. The ISR document can be read at the following link:
 The Ministry of Public Works & Housing has a loophole that might be sought to take responsibility for the delay of the provision of permanent housing. Point 7 in the ESCP document states that “In the event of a project change, unforeseen circumstances, or performance assessment resulting further changes to the risks and impacts of the execution; the Government of Indonesia will provide additional funding if necessary, to address these risks and impacts.” The important question is, whether the Ministry of Public Works & Housing is willing to make an effort to do this or not.
 The Monitoring Team with BIC held several online meetings with the NSUP-CERC and CSRRP Team from the World Bank, led by Andre A. Bald. Some of which were held on June 25, 2020, November 18, 2020, and June 17, 2021. In the last meeting, as the Team Leader of NSUP-CERC and CSRRP, Andre Bald promised to arrange for another online meeting with the Monitoring Team at the end of August 2021. Until now, the meeting did not/has not been conducted, with no further notification to us.
 Due to the effort of the Government of Palu City, the cases of land claim at the Talise-Valangguni location currently has already found a solution. However, specifically for the Ministry of Public Works & Housing, which conducted the land clearing process at the location, if referring to the ESMF documents, both ESMF NSUP and ESMF CSRRP, they are still indebted to the people of Talise-Valangguni, which farmlands had been cleared, because these people are entitled to compensation planting.
 Our response to the report published by the World Bank can be read in the following link: https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=4121 (English version) or https://monitoring.skp-ham.org/?p=4126 (Bahasa Indonesia version).